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services. 3 As they amass information about their users, calls for regulation have focused on the threats to privacy they generate. Some of these efforts have been successful; others look more doubtful. 4 One thing is certain: they are only the beginning of a struggle over the rights and responsibilities of key intermediaries.
While this first generation of privacy regulation centers on accountable use of the personal information amassed by search engines, second generation concerns will focus on search results. 5 For example, when results appear in response to a search engine user's query, various entities who thought themselves necessarily associated with the query may be disappointed. 6 Obscurity hurts. On the other hand, digital "scarlet letters" can be amplified by prominence in search results. 7 Personalized and stratified search services also promise to be controversial. Just as attorneys who can afford Westlaw have an advantage over those who cannot, searchers may eventually find themselves bidding for access to "premium databases" on DSEs. University libraries that now rely on Google Scholar or Book Search have no guarantee that these services will always be free. Though some might find the tiered provision of data uncontroversial, all should agree that search engines should not be given special privileges or fair use protection on the unwarranted assumption that their current policies of open access will continue indefinitely.
Personalized search capabilities also raise novel questions in information policy. The more DSEs know about users, the more targeted their ads and services will become. 8 Many scholars have already addressed the privacy problems that such information asymmetries will generate. 9 Still to be analyzed are the effects of data accumulation on the market for search itself. Will increasingly personalized search tend to lock consumers in to using already favored DSEs? Who controls the data that users and search engines together generate? 10 [2008:
Cyberlaw scholars have begun to address these concerns within extant legal categories. Trademark law governs consumer associations; defamation law concerns false and harmful statements; and copyright law governs indexing projects like Book Search. However, communications and intellectual property law provide safe harbors that can trump legal claims sounding in each of these areas.' 1 For example, although immunities from tort liability provided under the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") were designed for carriers regulated by the Federal Communications Commission, they have been extended by courts to cover search engines. 12 That extension provokes the question: should some of carriers' obligations, as well as their immunities, also apply to search engines?
In this Article I contend that the safe harbors that shield dominant search engines from liability also suggest patterns of responsibility for the results they present. The expansion of CDA immunity from carriers to search engines suggests that DSEs and carriers are infrastructurally homologous. Like carriers, DSEs are simultaneously stable conduits, dynamic cartographers, indexers, and gatekeepers of the internet. Some of the owned by you and be portable anywhere. You should be able to move or copy your data from one location to another location. Essentially, you should be able to export your data from [any given online repository] and import it to a different system. When you join a new social network, you should be able to take your social graph from Facebook or LinkedIn with you and tear down these walled gardens." See Frank Pasquale, Zero-Sum Reputation Games, Posting to Madisonian Weblog, available at <http://madisonian.net 2007/12/08/zero-sum-reputation-games/> (last visited Apr 15, 2008). Hoffman's service Rapleaf would attempt to solve this data portability problem. Id. However, Hoffman's solution might create more privacy problems even as it advances competition online, because it would allow individual users to reproduce data now held by particular compa- same common carrier regulations DSEs now insist should govern carriers should also be applied to themselves. Moreover, as the number of joint ventures and alliances between search engines and carriers increases, it will become more and more difficult to give principled grounds for regulating one without also regulating the other.
DSEs now anchor an Open Internet Coalitiop that advocates for "net neutrality."' 13 This coalition argues that carriers must not be allowed to discriminate for or against certain clients-for example, that Verizon should not be allowed to speed Yahoo search results to its customers ten times faster than Google results (in exchange for, say, a share of Yahoo's profits). Such proposals have sparked a spirited legal debate, including the carriers' contention that Google is a much more threatening bottleneck than the carriers. 14 This Article clarifies and extends that debate by explaining how DSEs' own advocacy for transparency and accountability for carriers suggests broader principles for regulation of search engines generally. Part II defines these internet nondiscrimination principles in the context of a broader debate over network neutrality. Part III explores more concretely how these principles could be applied to dominant search engines. Part IV concludes with some reflections on the normative appeal of a common commercial ethic for dominant platforms online.
II. THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE
The "network neutrality" debate has raged in telecommunications law for over a decade. 15 The debate has recently focused on the degree to which network operators who provide information services can discriminate in favor of or against certain content providers and applications. Dominant search engines have pressed for rules that create a "level playing field" online.
13 See A Guide to Net Neutrality for Google Users, Google, Inc, available at <http://www.google.com/help/netneutrality.html> (last visited Mar 27, 2008) ("In our view, the broadband carriers should not be permitted to use their market power to discriminate against competing applications or content.").
14 See Saul Hansell, AT&T Mulls Watching You Surf, N. Y. Times Bits Blog, Aug 14, 2008 (available at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/att-wants-to-watch-you-readads/) (last visited Aug 28, 2008) (noting that an AT&T spokesman had taken a "took a rather combative approach toward Google and other Internet advertising firms. Their targeting methods, she said, 'are as effective as any technique that an I.S.P. might employ at creating specific customer profiles and enabling highly targeted advertising."').
15 See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality FAQs, available at <http://timwu.org/network_ neutrality.html> (last visited Mar 27, 2008).
Net neutrality has become a cause cjl~bre among legal academics and technologists. Many fear that powerful carriers will effectively tax innovation and culture by auctioning off a "fasttrack" and degrading the quality of service of those who cannot afford it.16 Such actions would have been highly suspect before broadband arose, but now appear possible given the FCC's deregulation of its provision. In the absence of common carriage rules, several problematic possibilities may arise. For example, HBO programs may be delivered ten times as fast as Univision ones, and wealthy churches' programming may be transmitted with crystalline clarity (leaving poorer churches consigned to a grainy obsolescence).
17 Users may find their connection to YouTube suddenly lost whenever they try to watch something that has not been pre-approved by a consortium of content owners. Indeed, in many cases carriers are also content owners or distributors, and have a vested interest in diminishing the attractiveness of free services vis-a-vis their own offerings. In response to such possibilities, leading activists have lobbied the FCC to impose "net neutrality" rules on major carriers designed to assure nondiscrimination in the delivery of bits. 1 8 Yet there are sometimes good business reasons to provide more access to some users and less to others. ' 9 To what extent should broadband providers be able to discriminate among different applications on their networks? Should all packets of data on the net be trackable, and if so, should companies that control o advocate primary reliance on antitrust principles ignores important historical facts. Common carriage regulation, both under the common law and statutorily, evolved prior to antitrust regulation. Thus, antitrust law subsequently evolved to augment-that is, to address issues and situations not already encompassed by-common carriage.... Advocates of a regime based solely on antitrust fail to explain how the issues pertaining to the provider-to-customer relationship, that have been governed by the ex ante rules of industry-specific common carriage regulation, will be adequately addressed by antitrust ex post remedies."). the network also be able to prioritize certain packets on the basis of their source? Questions like these are at the center of network neutrality debates.
Even many of those in favor of net neutrality now agree that congestion-based pricing is acceptable-heavy users take up more space on the network, and ought to be charged accordingly. 20 Furthermore, since any network design has some inherent bias, the debate has now turned away from the ideal of a wholly neutral network, to fundamental principles of nondiscrimination within crucial conduits. 21
Though a full investigation of the merits of these principles is beyond the scope of this paper, technical, economic, and cultural perspectives on the controversy should inform future discussions of search engine regulation. Information policy expert Edward Felten contends that "relatively few people understand the mechanics of network discrimination" and urges that any discussion of network neutrality clearly lay out "technical motivations for discrimination, the various kinds of discrimination and how they would actually be put into practice, and what countermeasures would then be available to users and regulators. ' 22 His pr6cis "Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality" provides such background; here I focus on the points especially relevant to nondiscrimination principles generally. table in Washington but no rules yet adopted, is in many ways ideal. ISPs, knowing that discriminating now would make regulation seem more necessary, are on their best behavior; and with no rules yet adopted we don't have to face the difficult issues of linedrawing and enforcement. Enacting strong regulation now would risk side-effects, and passing toothless regulation now would remove the threat of regulation. If it is possible to maintain the threat of regulation while leaving the issue unresolved, time will teach us more about what regulation, if any, is needed." Id at 10.
Felten makes the following observations about the structure of the internet:
The Internet consists of a set of end-user computers connected by infrastructure that carries data between those computers. This infrastructure is basically a set of routers (think: metal boxes with electronics inside) connected by links (think: long wires). Packets of data get passed from one router to another, via links. A packet is forwarded from router to router, until it arrives at its destination.23
Felten explains that the routers can manage the traffic they receive in many ways. If the wires are uncongested, packets of data simply move through the network. However, if congestion is detected by one of the routers, it has several options for addressing the problem. It can simply drop packets, or it can deprioritize them, delaying their transmission until the congestion is alleviated. Felten calls these two responses "blocking" packets and "delaying" packets, and notes that "blocking a packet is harsher than just lowering its priority." 24 Delay may be part of a "minimal discrimination" program that is only aimed at traffic management; blocking suggests "non-minimal discrimination" with ulterior motives. 25 For example, internet researchers have recently accused Comcast of secretly blocking some internet traffic. 26 They argue that Comcast "interferes with attempts by some of its high-speed internet subscribers to share files online, a move that runs counter to the tradition of treating all types of Net traffic equally." 27 They would not object if Comcast adopted a blanket policy of limiting, say, low-paying customers to a certain amount of downloads, and permitting higher-paying customers to download twice as much. Rather, they object to Comcast's blocking certain applications, such as BitTorrent. To net neutrality advocates, this type of discrimination is a troubling exercise of power that is not connected to protecting the network or relieving congestion. It is too blunt an instrument to be justified on those terms. A carrier has a right to manage traffic when congestion becomes a problem, but such management ought to be based on usage, not on applications.
Another key concern is the transparency of network management techniques. In the example mentioned above, Comcast has also been accused of masking its traffic management methods. 28 Under basic principles of transparency, Comcast and other carriers should be required to report on their blocking and deprioritizing practices. Regardless of the particular ways of enforcing a transparency principle, it is important to Google a physical layer, the "actual wires or airwaves over which data will flow;" an application layer, "representing the tasks people might want to perform on the network;" a content layer, "containing actual information exchanged among the network's
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Market power at any given layer can distort competition at other layers. For example, consider antitrust complaints against Microsoft. European authorities accused the company of using its dominance in the operating system market to foreclose competition at the application layer (for software like browsers and media players).3 1 Microsoft's position is not unique-dominant intermediaries can be just as powerful as dominant operating system owners.
The debate over network neutrality focuses on whether owners of the physical layer can charge certain application and content providers for high-speed access for their packets. The debate is not over whether the carriers can charge high-traffic users more than low-traffic users: no one objects if a site transmitting a thousand gigabytes (a terabyte) of information a month is charged ten times more than a site transmitting 100 gigabytes. Rather, the concern is that carriers will strike deals with certain content or applications providers (such as Disney or MySpace) to privilege them over other providers.
Legal and economic factors have pushed network discrimination policies to the top of the communications policy agenda in the United States. While the U.S. was once the global leader in internet access and penetration, it is now middling among OECD countries and falling further behind innovators in Europe and Japan. 32 Under Michael Powell the FCC advanced a largely deregulatory agenda that granted carriers increasing power to manage networks without government scrutiny. 33 would argue this agenda simply reflects carriers' outsized political influence, 34 major network operators argue that they need to be able to charge more to content and applications providers in order to invest in their networks. 35 They believe they can only secure investment capital to install upgrades like fiber optic lines if they can convince investors that they exercise tight control over the content that flows through their conduits.
36
Advocates of network neutrality take exactly the opposite approach, and use the case study of Japan to make their point:
In sharp contrast to the Bush administration over the same time period, regulators in Japan compelled big phone companies to open up wires to upstart Internet providers. In short order, broadband exploded.... [T]he story of how Japan outclassed the United States in the provision of better, cheaper Internet service suggests that forceful government regulation can pay substantial dividends. 37 the year, and disclose to both the Commission and the public the details of the network management practices that it intends to deploy following termination of its current practices.").
34 35 A telecom CEO colorfully expressed his views on net neutrality as follows: "How do you think [applications and content providers are] going to get customers? Through a broadband pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do is use my pipes for free, but I ain't going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there's going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion they're using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? The Internet can't be free in that sense, because we and the cable companies have made an investment and To counter stories like this, advocates of deregulation have done extensive economic modeling designed to prove that a laissez-faire approach will ultimately be more efficient. Though some in the academic community share their enthusiasm for reducing regulation, many others have found the economic arguments wanting.38 that major companies do not have to share phone or fiber lines with competitors. The Bush administration did not appeal the court ruling. 'The Bush administration largely turned its back on the Internet, so we have just drifted downwards,' said Thomas Bleha, a former U.S. diplomat who served in Japan and is writing a history of how that country trumped the United States in broadband. Sidestepping that controversy, Jerry Kang has opened up the network neutrality debate by demonstrating that economic concerns are only one of many considerations in this policy space. 39 These concerns include the importance of media diversity, independent gatekeepers, and "distribution of communicative power and opportunities among private actors." 40 Both application and content providers believe that they would have to compete unfairly with larger corporations (or, worse, subsidiaries of carriers) in the absence of net neutrality rules. For example, the Future of Music Coalition raises this possibility:
What would happen if Sony paid Comcast so that sonymusic.com would run faster than iTunes or, more important, faster than cdbaby.com-where over 135,000 indie artists sell their music. Would a new form of Internet payola emerge, with large Internet content providers striking business deals with the dominant Internet service providers? 41 Lest this appear to be mere speculation, Bill D. Herman lists a number of recent examples of content and application blocking. 42 During a bitter labor dispute, the Canadian carrier Telus blocked access to a union website. AT&T censored the rock group Pearl Jam's anti-Bush lyrics. Comcast has blocked BitTorrent, and some service providers have scuttled service directed to competitors Vonage and Skype. While carriers try to trivialize each incident individually, the pattern suggests a willingness to tilt the digital playing field against disfavored content and applications.
Extant incidents involving carriers blocking access to content they disapproved of and applications that competed with their own proprietary services suggests the inadequacy of a purely economic perspective on net neutrality. For example, it is Economic models tend to miss the cultural importance of media consolidation. FCC rules here ultimately govern a "battle for mindshare" 44 and cannot be resolved solely by economic analysis alone.
III. APPLYING INTERNET NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES TO SEARCH ENGINES
Advocates of net neutrality have been pleasantly surprised by Google's advocacy for their cause. The leading U.S. search engine has weighed in on topics ranging from non-degradation commitments to the upcoming wireless auction. As it develops its own "Google Phone," it has pushed wireless carriers to recognize the types of basic consumer freedoms residents of other industrialized countries take for granted. It has focused policymakers on the dangers of permitting a few dominant carriers to act as unaccountable bottlenecks controlling the flow of information.
As Google has become a leading corporate advocate for net neutrality, the debate has taken an unexpected turn. The carriers now argue that Google itself poses more of a threat of "bottlenecking" than those it is calling to account. Even the Wall Street Journal recognizes it as a uniquely powerful hub in the network. In a July 2007 editorial, Holman Jenkins said "Google's ... dominance in search and advertising... [and] its ability to control which Web sites and Web businesses receive traffic makeo it a far likelier candidate for 'public utility' treatment than the... players who make up the broadband world. ' 45 Many advocates of net neutrality are uncomfortable with this idea, because they believe that search engines are funda- Unfortunately, Sohn ignores the many barriers to entry in the search engine market. 48 As Public Knowledge itself has stated with respect to broadband access, the question is not whether competitors hypothetically can provide new options to consumers. Rather, regulators need to focus on the choices popular and prevalent now, and to protect their consumers from the 46 Public Knowledge is a public interest group that advocates for consumer rights online. It has lobbied against expansive intellectual property rules, broadband discrimination, and excessive corporate influence in the shaping of FCC policy. 4s In Federal Search Commission (cited in note 3), Bracha and I analyzed several aspects of the search market and concluded: "The net result of these structural features of the search market is substantial advantages to large incumbents and very high barriers to entry. It suggests that the current pattern of a handful of significant players and an overwhelming dominance of one firm is not incidental and that it is likely to persist." James Grimmelmann has pointed out to me another reason to predict Google's selfreinforcing dominance: its knowledge of consumer habits is unparalleled. It offers to marketers by far the most targeted advertising capabilities, and the longer it dominates the field, the larger its advantage over others becomes. Like Western Union's stock in the 1860s, Google's stock has skyrocketed in value as investors recognize these advantages. Such success can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as its capitalization will help reinforce its dominance. untoward consequences of stealth marketing, 49 vertical integration of "pipes" and content, and discrimination against content providers either too poor or too controversial to merit priority treatment by powerful companies.
Concededly, search results cannot be entirely neutral due to their inherently hierarchical structure: some site will have to be at the top of the list and others at the bottom. 50 Whereas physical congestion on a network can be alleviated by new technology, it is difficult to imagine a technical solution to the "mental congestion" occasioned by information overload. Nevertheless, the negative effects of certain types of discrimination would render DSE bias analogous to broadband discrimination in many important respects. Moreover, joint ventures between search engines and carriers foreshadow increasing opportunities for the former to assume the social importance of the latter-or do their bidding.
This Part of the Article will focus on the common intellectual underpinnings of movements for search neutrality and net neutrality. Though net neutrality can have many meanings, for our purposes Google's demands will provide a stable referent for the term. Section A explores the parallels between dominant search engines and dominant carriers. Section B fleshes out how certain discriminatory practices, if carried out by search engines, would threaten economic efficiency, individual autonomy, and democratic values. Ultimately, internet nondiscrimination principles should be applied equally to dominant players, whether search engines or carriers. 
A. From Net Neutrality to Search Neutrality
From a purely pragmatic business standpoint, it is easy to see why search engines (and many other application providers) favor net neutrality. They do not want carriers to cut into their profits, or to be forced into an unfair competition with the subsidiaries or business partners of carriers. 51 Presently the consumer and producer surplus generated by the use of search engines is mostly shared between users of search engines and search engines themselves. If carriers could discriminate among search engine providers, they could appropriate some of that surplus. More ominously, carriers might shut out some search engines altogether.
Given this possibility, dominant search engines and other application providers have become worried that they may be disadvantaged by carriers. Google's position here is representative, and given its cultural and economic importance it is appropriate to examine its positions particularly closely. In defining its own stance on net neutrality, Google has stated that the following actions by carriers should be presumptively illegal: 1) Levying surcharges on content providers that are not their retail customers;
2) Prioritizing data packet delivery based on the ownership or affiliation (the who) of the content, or the source or destination (the what) of the content;
3) Building a new "fast lane" online that consigns Internet content and applications to a relatively slow, bandwidth-starved portion of the broadband connection. 27, 2008 ). Google has further proposed specific methods of enforcing the commitments it proposes for carriers, including: "(1) some incremental fixes (like requiring carriers to submit semiannual reports with broadband deployment data, and mandating that carriers provide clear and conspicuous terms of service to customers); (2) structural changes (various forms of network-based competition, such as interconnection, open access, municipal networks, and spectrum-based plat-
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Each of these proposed applications of net neutrality principles deserves some explication.
First, Google fears that carriers may try to punish content providers that fail to, say, purchase internet access from them. Both web users and content providers must pay for access to the web. Major content providers like Google must pay far more than, say, a small search engine. Without net neutrality provisions, Verizon might decide that if Google chooses another carrier for internet access, it will slow down bits from Google delivered to residential customers who use Verizon for their access. Or it might levy a surcharge on Google to avoid such degradation in quality of service.
The second ideal of nondiscrimination is the mirror image of the first. Imagine that a carrier and a search engine strike a deal whereby those searching on the latter will be routed to their sites twice as fast as those using Google, if the search engine agrees to give the carrier 30 percent of the advertising revenue generated by its business. Google's position is that competition in the search field should be driven by the quality of search services, not by deals between search engines and carriers.
The third application joins a battle of metaphors that has long characterized the debate over network neutrality. As mentioned above, the carriers claim that a ban on a fast lane would be as unproductive as a ban on express mail. They also make economic arguments about the desirability of price discrimination in many transportation contexts. First class travelers can subsidize the rest of the plane; congestion pricing on highways forces individuals to internalize the costs of driving at rush hour. However, these tiered pricing mechanisms are in principle open to any customers; network neutrality advocates worry about certain entities being unduly delayed, or frozen out altogether:
Imagine if you tried to order a pizza and the phone company said AT&T's preferred pizza vendor is Domino's. Press one to connect to Domino's now. If you would still like to order from your neighborhood pizzeria, please hold for three minutes while Domino's guaranteed orders are placed. Carriers respond that it is disingenuous for Google to analogize its position to that of a local pizza shop. They are the dominant search engine, and some economists claim that other search engines will only be able to compete with Google if they are favored by carriers. Libertarians with a Schumpeterian vision of competition claim that the carriers may be laying the ground for their own destruction if they treat dominant search engines too provocatively. 54 The highly capitalized Google might try to build its own network to "rout around" the incumbents. 55 The carriers also challenge other aspects of Google's professed devotion to an "open innovation environment." For example, if a site sends out a great deal of spam, the carrier may deter future bad behavior by de-prioritizing "data packet delivery based on the ownership or affiliation (the who) of the content." The carriers could point to Google's own practice of warning users of malware or other harmful aspects of sites that come up on search results. 56 On this understanding, Google is as much a "traffic manager" on the web as the carriers. Yet this would be a bad example for the carriers, because Google has committed to net/2006/10/27/big-cables-ridiculou.html> (last visited Mar 28, 2008) (quoting Craig Newmark, founder of craigslist.com). See also Wu's congressional testimony: "Americans are accustomed to basic rights to use the network as they see fit. That's why there's been surprise and indignation over plans, advanced by the Bells, to begin deciding what consumers want, by slowing down disfavored companies, and speeding up favored companies. It's as if the electric company one day announced that refrigerators made by General Electric would henceforth not work quite as well as those made by Samsung. That would be a shock, because when it comes to the electric grid and the internet, people are used to a network that they are free to use as they wish. Second, whatever AT&T and others may claim as motives, the potential for abuse of market power is obvious to everyone. Ninetyfour percent of Americans have either zero, one, or two choices for broadband access." Oversight Hearing on "Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access" before the House Committee on the Judiciary Telecom 56 See Zittrain, 119 Harv L Rev at Part II (cited in note 21) (describing the gravity of security threats online and how different 'layers" of online life (at the carrier, operating system, and application levels) could help alleviate them). making the process of identifying malware transparent and open to the public. It has partnered with a nonprofit organization (StopBadWare.org, based at Harvard Law School's Berkman Center) to assure that some kind of due process is available to owners of sites that are labeled as harmful. Carriers like Comcast would prefer to have the ability to manage traffic surreptitiously.
Yet when we look behind the reasons for carriers' aspirations for an untrammeled right to control traffic, a more compelling analogy between their own position and that of Google emerges. Carriers fear that once they begin discriminating among packets, their retail customers, software manufacturers, and application providers will begin countermeasures. 5 7 For example, if BitTorrent knows that Comcast is slowing down its users' packets, it may start masking them, sending them from proxy sites, or strategies pioneered by post-Napster peer-to-peer file-sharing sites online. Just as the content industries' digital rights management ("DRM") methodologies have been hacked repeatedly, 58 the carriers might worry that their own network management schemes could be evaded.
Google offers a similar rationale for keeping its search results a tightly guarded trade secret. DSEs are afraid that indexed entities who want to be prominent in highly ranked results will "game" the system. 59 The practice of "Google bombing" provides a straightforward example of the phenomenon. 60 For example, at one point liberal activists began to link the words "miserable failure" to President Bush, and soon the President's official White House biography became the top result whenever "miserable failure" was entered into Google. 6 1 Conservative blogs soon retaliated by elevating Michael Moore to the second search result through their own manipulation of hyperlinks.
Though google-bombing is not a major problem presently, "black hat" search engine optimization is.62 Search engine optimization ("SEO") boils down to the commodification of salience: 63 SEOs configure their clients' sites (and those linking to them) in order to assure that the optimized site is highly ranked in response to certain queries. In the SEO community, "white hat" tactics are those known to have the imprimatur of DSEs; "black hat" tactics are known to be verboten. "Black hat" tactics include efforts to raise clients' PageRank with "link farms," "splogs" (spam blogs), and other practices that clutter the web.64 To the extent such companies reverse engineer page-ranking algorithms, they can more easily engage in these tactics. In ordinary markets, the presence of highspending consumers will draw more producers so that, eventually, supply will approach demand. However, there can only be one 'top-ranked' site. Tactics to influence unpaid listings and prices for paid listings are sure to escalate, but it is not clear that this competition creates much utility.").
64 See Grimmelmann, 93 Iowa L Rev at 13-14 (cited in note 5). This prospect is particularly troubling because of the growth of the SEO industry and the obscure and shifting line between "black hat" and "white hat" SEO tactics. The result of substantial transparency could be degradation of the quality of search and its usefulness to users. Moreover, widespread and effective gaming tactics may exacerbate the structural biases of search engines in favor of commercial and well-financed players.
In response to SEO that they deem improper, dominant search engines have kept their search algorithms mostly secret, 65 and have only begun to reveal how they work. 66 According to one of its court filings, "Google takes extraordinary measures to protect its trade secrets and confidential commercial information. '67 Like FICO scores 68 and much proprietary voting machine software, 69 the algorithm that generates Google's search results is a zealously guarded trade secret. 70 Despite the risks of gaming, there is a strong social interest in transparency and accountability here. 71 Suspicion about FICO scores has led some states to prohibit their use in insurance rating, 72 and Finland has prevented employers from using Google results in evaluating potential applicants. 73 Such legislation stems from a well-justified suspicion of unaccountable data sources. Many webmasters live in fear of the "Google Death Penalty"-relegation to the bottom of results for a "gray" search engine optimization tactic. The thin and ever-shifting line between "black hat" and "white hat" search engine optimization raises serious questions about DSE arbitrariness. More ominously, DSEs can openly profit from opacity here. If there is no clear route to the top of "organic results" for a given term, the only way to assure one's association with it is to buy "paid results" from DSEs themselves. Just as DSEs worry that carriers may deliberately impair quality of service in order to force application providers to pay for a "fast lane," content providers may legitimately worry that DSEs "churn" organic results in order to make paid ads the only guaranteed method of reaching customers.
Such concerns will only grow if DSE's continue to arrange joint ventures with carriers, or vertically integrate with them. The old narrative of "carrier vs. search engine" may give way to new forms of cooperation that magnify the effects of bias by the collaborating entities. 7 4 For example, Google has recently coinvested with Comcast and handset manufacturers to develop a new "Clearwire" network. 75 In return for its participation, "Google's search engine [will] get[] its own button on the phones." 76 It is hard to imagine a more effective "fast tracking" of 
one application provider's site past other competitors' offerings. Another deal in the works would "make Google the default search provider on Verizon devices and give it a share of ad revenue." 77 As the landscape of internet competition rapidly shifts, DSE's like Google may become less a countervailing force keeping carriers accountable, and more a beneficiary of the very discriminatory tactics they once decried.
As such deals advance, public awareness of their terms is essential. 78 There is a growing awareness, in a variety of contexts, of the troubling aspects of a "black box society" in which private firms are empowered to lock away information even in the face of strong public interest in disclosure. 79 In many cases, it is essential that someone has the power to "look under the hood." Search engines insist on some degree of transparency in network operators' traffic management practices. As the next section demonstrates, there are many reasons for them to commit to limited forms of transparency as well.
B. Practical Implications of DSEs' Status As Infrastructure
Even if the parallels between search engines and carriers demonstrate the former to be as infrastructural as the latter, the well-trod regulatory path toward carrier accountability does not exist for search technology. The FCC has statutory authority to impose nondiscrimination rules on carriers generally, and antitrust clearances provide a clear opportunity for their applica- tion.80 There is no parallel Federal Search Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission's antitrust investigation in the industry focuses on a narrow economic measure of consumer welfare effects. 8 1 Nevertheless, current controversies over dominant search engines' practices offer some "pressure points" for applying nondiscrimination principles.
First, the basic business practices of search engines raise difficult questions in copyright law. Publishers have sued Google for copyright infringement for several aspects of its Book Search program, and Viacom has a plausible case that YouTube induces infringement. Section III B 1 below suggests that courts considering each case should condition any outcome in favor of Google (and its subsidiary, YouTube) on their maintaining open access to search results on each platform. Such a condition would help assure that the type of "tiered access" common for legal resources would not further pervade the networked world. If Google's novel extensions of the fair use defense and DMCA safe harbors succeed in each case, such holdings should be limited to current versions of the services that conduce to a common informational infrastructure. To the extent it or other DSEs limit access to parts of their index, their public-spirited defenses of archiving and indexing projects are suspect. Dominant search engines also face a great deal of controversy over their use of trademarked terms.8 2 For example, if a user queries "Nike," a number of Nike's competitors may appear both among organic and paid results. Is the search engine contributing to trademark infringement or dilution by permitting those competitors to use Nike's own mark to advertise their services? Although it may be difficult to sympathize with Nike when its own paid results and corporate-sponsored sites dominate results for the search "Nike," smaller companies may easily become "lost in the shuffle" of search engine optimization and ad keyword auctions. Internet nondiscrimination principles help mediate between the interests of trademark owners and dominant search engines by refusing each a monopoly of reference. While trademark owners should not be able to prevent all competitors from using this vital new communications platform to compete, neither should a search engine be able to effectively force small trademark holders to buy ad keywords in order to be visible in a search for a trademark they own. 8 3 Part III B 2 below explores some solutions to the current trademark controversy that might best satisfy what Greg Lastowka calls the public's "indexical interest." 8 4 Nondiscrimination principles explain current concerns about potentially deceptive trade practices. In 2002, the Federal Trade Commission warned search engines that they should clearly separate paid from organic results. The FTC worried that search engines' public assurances that organic results were "objective" could be misleading to consumers if they were actually driven by marketing revenue or business partnerships. Internet nondiscrimination principles demand a much more skeptical look at current DSE ranking methods than the FTC has been willing to adopt. Like the big firms that offer both accounting and consulting services to major corporations, Google is increasingly in the position of both (a) evaluating the proper "rank" of an entity among its peers on certain reputational axes and (b) offering business partnerships to such an entity for its marketing, email, and social networking needs. DSEs need to be clear about exactly how their business partnerships (and corporate takeovers) affect organic search results. Though the technical fact-finding here may be difficult, some third party needs to be able to evaluate DSEs current claims (and implicit assurances) that their organic results are "objective" and unbiased by other business relationships.
Each of these proposals is described in more detail below. 8 5 Subsections 1 and 2 below explore the first and second principles in more detail.
Both DSEs and carriers are vital platforms for the conduct of life online. Each of these intermediaries should be required to follow basic nondiscrimination norms in order to assure fair competition and innovation in applications and content. 
Book Search as universal service.
Google's plans to scan and index hundreds of thousands of copyrighted books have provoked extraordinary public controversy and private litigation. 8 6 This project essentially is one of several efforts by DSEs to archive and provide text-based indexing for an enormous number of books. Scanning of copyrighted books is prima facie infringement, but Google is presently asserting a fair use defense. 87 The debate has largely centered on the rival property rights of Google and the owners of the copyrights of the books it would scan and edit. 88 Given Google's alliance with some of the leading libraries in the world, journalistic narratives have largely portrayed the Google Book Search project as an untrammeled advance in public access to knowledge. However, other libraries are beginning to question the restrictive terms of the contracts that Google strikes when it agrees to scan and create a digital database of a library's books. 8 9 While each library is guaranteed access to the books it agrees to have scanned, it is not guaranteed access to the entire index of scanned works.
DSEs' restrictive terms foreshadow potential future restrictions on and tiering of their book search services. Well-funded libraries may pay a premium to receive access to all sources; lesser institutions may be left to scrounge among digital scraps.
If permitted to become prevalent, such tiered access to information would threaten to rigidify and reinforce existing inequalities in access to knowledge and life chances. 9 0 Much information may be used not simply to improve its user's life but also to help its user gain advantage over others in positional competitions. 91 Such tiering divides society into two groups-those who can afford to access the information, and those who cannot. To the extent that the latter group's relative poverty is not its own fault, information tiering inequitably subjects it to yet another disadvantage, whereby others' wealth can be leveraged into status, educational, or occupational advantage.
92
Given the diciness of the fair use case for projects like Google Book Search, courts should consider conditioning favorable fair use findings for DSEs' on universal access to the contents of the resulting database. Landmark cases like Sony v Universal have set a precedent for taking such broad public interests into account in the course of copyright litigation. 9 3 Given the importance of "commerciality" in the first of the four fair use factors, suspicion of tiered access could also be figured into that prong of the test. A more ambitious (if less likely) solution would require 91 Some close-to-home examples illustrate this idea. Most lawyers don't simply read case law and secondary sources in order to find out the state of the law-they use it to prevail in a dispute. A person may take a drug to cure baldness, not simply in order to approach some platonic ideal of attractiveness, but to appear better than others. An LSAT preparation course does not primarily exist in order to improve students' argumentative and problem-solving skills-one is rarely called upon to arrange lions, tigers, and bears into a series of color-coordinated cages (as one characteristic game asked testtakers to do). Rather, students take the course to help themselves best thousands of other competitors for places in law schools.
92 Moreover, even though the group that can afford access to the primarily PositionEnhancing Information ("PEF') is advantaged relative to those who cannot, the development of PEI may be inefficient for that group as well. The benefit of distancing itself from those who cannot afford the information may well be outweighed by the cost of access. And precisely to the extent that this cost is lowered, the positional advantage afforded by the innovation dissipates. In other words, PEI creates inequity when it first arises, and inefficiency as it becomes more universally accessible. See Congress to set such terms in a legislative settlement of the issue.
2. Ban on stealth marketing.
As a matter of fair use law, the Google Book Search project is a coin toss. Experts have no idea how the courts will rule on it, and the leading precedents are in conflict. 94 Google may even "win by losing." If its archiving is not deemed a fair use, its extraordinary market capitalization will still leave it in a good position to license content from publishers, just as it has licensed news from the Associated Press. 95 Nascent licensing practices or settlements may contribute to the development of legal doctrine that creates substantial barriers to entry for would-be competitors of licensees. 96 This possibility helps us focus on what is ultimately the most compelling argument for allowing search engines to archive and categorize extant works: the social good inherent in keeping ranking and reviewing systems independent of the owners of the ranked and reviewed content. While Google's Book Search program promises to advance this value, it also needs to be realized in Google's own services.
For an example of what can happen when such systems are controlled by the owners of ranked and reviewed work, we need look no further than the facts that led to Video Pipeline, Inc v Buena Vista Home Entertainment. 9 7 In that case, a company specializing in the business of movie preview compilation and organization sold clips of movies, without permission from the movie copyright holders, to retailers for use on their websites. Users could not download the clips, but each time a user viewed a clip on a retailer's website, the retailer paid a fee. The copyright holders of the movies claimed that the use of the clips constituted copyright infringement. The Third Circuit found in favor of Buena Vista (a Disney subsidiary) by focusing on "the potential harm to the market for Disney's derivative trailers," 99 determining that Video Pipeline's unauthorized use of the trailers wrongfully denied the plaintiffs the right to charge for that content. 10 0 The appellate panel did not even consider whether potential positive effects on sales or rentals of the underlying movies might swamp these negative effects.
More importantly, the court played down concerns about how the film studios' control over all uses of trailers would affect the ecology of expression about films. Movie studios have used restrictive licensing agreements to block criticism. 1 0 ' Disney's license terms are quite clear: those licensed to use its trailers are not to criticize the licensed content, or Disney itself, or even the entertainment industry generally. 1 0 2 The Video Pipeline court conceded that "anti-competitive licensing agreements may conflict with the purpose behind a copyright's protection by depriving the public of the would-be competitor's creativity."' 1 0 3 However, the court found no real problem here because the defendant was free to criticize Disney films on websites lacking Disney trailers.
Like the "licensed reviewers" whom Judge Posner questioned in Ty v. PIL, 0 4 licensed categorizers may be overly inclined to praise their partners' work, while ignoring the work of others (whatever its relevance or merits). Android open handset alliance with more salience in search results? 1 08 Just as Google wants the carriers to be open about how they manage traffic, it should be transparent about exactly how its commercial relationships affect the ranking of its business partners and customers. Without such transparency, regulators will not be able to assess whether the company is engaged in stealth marketing, a deceptive trade practice. 109
As Ellen Goodman has observed, "American mass media law has long been hostile to stealth marketing. It is illegal ... for a record company to make secret payments to radio stations to play music ... or for an advertiser or organization to pay broadcasters to feature products ... without identifying the sponsor." 1 10 The Federal Trade Commission has made some tentative steps toward recognizing the potential for consumer deception here. 1 11 In 2002, it sent a letter to various search engine firms recommending that they clearly and conspicuously distinguish paid placements from other results. 112 The letter was sent in response to a complaint by the organization Commercial Alert 113 that requested FTC investigation of whether paid placements practices of several search engines constituted unlawful deceptive advertising. 114 The deception argument as applied to search engines is a variant of the more general criticism of stealth mar- 109 Goodman, 85 Tex L Rev at 89 (cited in note 49) ("Stealth marketing [can take the form of] conventional payola, where the sponsor promotes a media experience, such as a musical work, by purchasing audience exposure to the experience as a form of advertisement. Pay-for-play in broadcasting is similar to the use of slotting fees in the retail industries to obtain preferential shelf space in supermarkets and book stores. Online retail outlets also use slotting fees of a sort when portals like Amazon and Google accept payments for exposure of a particular product or service."). keting in the media. 115 Users, the argument goes, are misled to believe that "search results are based on relevancy alone," when in fact they are based on other grounds.
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Of course, those aware of the YouTube merger may assume that Google is going to elevate results from its subsidiary, and may diversify their search custom accordingly. They can use other search engines, or consult the second or third search pages for the results they seek. However, given searchers' documented inertia and unsophisticated understandings of extant search results, it is unlikely that these "self-help" measures will do much to level the playing field. 1 17 Though consumer education may be helpful here, given search's status as a credence service, it cannot entirely supplant regulation. 11 8 Another objection centers on the trade secrecy concerns briefly discussed in Part III A. above. For Google to demonstrate that it did not unfairly privilege subsidiaries or business partners, it may need to give away trade secrets about the way its rankings work. For example, a rival video search site might challenge the fact that YouTube's results always appear as the first thirty results in response to certain video queries for which it has demonstrably more relevant content. Google might respond with the following data:
1) The content on YouTube has more comments and therefore is weighted higher in search results.
2) The content on YouTube is clicked on more by searchers.
3) The content on YouTube has been through a copyright filter and therefore is less likely to infringe copyrights the trusted third party will be "subject to regulatory oversight for compliance with its escrow and privacy obligations."' 123 Stalwarts of deregulation may well complain that such procedures would still risk compromising the secrecy essential for search engines' operation and put an undue burden on their legal departments. However, Google has already complied with a government request for information about its search process and a judge has ruled that a protective order in that dispute adequately protected its trade secrecy interests. 1 24 Such limitations on secrecy are in order. If search engines are to be accountable at all, if their interest is to be balanced against those of the various other claimants involved in search-related disputes, 1 25 and if social values are to be given any weight, some governmental agent should be able to peer into the black box of search and determine whether or not illegitimate manipulation has occurred. 1 26
IV. CONCLUSION
Unaccountable power at any "layer" of online life can stifle innovation elsewhere. Microsoft's antitrust woes arose in part because it tried to manipulate complementary products to maintain its dominance in the operating system market. Now DSEs rightly worry that carriers will use their own power at the physical layer of Internet infrastructure to "pick winners" among content and application providers. DSEs have been much less quick to recognize the threat to openness and fair play their own practices may pose.
There are many parallels between dominant search engines and dominant carriers: at each layer intermediaries accumulate great power over the structure of online life. Concededly, paral-lels in and of themselves prove nothing. Deregulationists may portray "search neutrality" as a revealing reductio ad absurdum of internet nondiscrimination principles: "Start with the carriers, and where will it end?" Those committed to the accountability of dominant platforms will draw the opposite conclusion.
Though such differences of opinion may not be amenable to reason,1 27 some practical examples of search eng ne accountability can draw the sting of "slippery slope" arguments against regulation. Advocates for complete search engine autonomy tend to call their opponents utopian, too eager to force an idealized model of communicative processes on commercial entities. However, the types of practical accountability that flow from internet nondiscrimination principles may both clarify current legal uncertainty about search engines' practices and assure that their services develop in a way most likely to serve the public interest.
Just as DSEs fear an unfairly tiered online world, they should be required to provide access to their archives and indices in a nondiscriminatory manner. If DSEs want carriers to disclose their traffic management tactics, they should submit to regulation that bans stealth marketing and reliably verifies the absence of the practice. Finally, search engines' concern about the applications and content disadvantaged by carrier fast-tracking should lead them to provide annotation remedies to indexed sites whose marks have been unfairly occluded by the search process. Fair competition online demands common commercial ethics for both dominant search engines and dominant carriers. 
